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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Jones v. United States,3 an engineer on a vessel was 
making his rounds as duty officer when he fell in the emergency 
diesel generator room. He did not see what caused him to slip 
and fall. He did not notice any grease on his shoes or pants when 
1. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957). 
2. LSU Interim President, Dodson and Hooks Endowed Chair and 
Maritime Law and James Huntington and Patricia Kleinpeter Odom Professor 
of Law. This Article was presented as a lecture as part of the Davis Lecture 
Series of the Federal Bar Association-Lafayette and Acadiana Region. The 
lecture honors Judge W. Eugene Davis of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit. Judge Davis is a wonderful judge; to someone in my field, 
Admiralty, he is a paragon. He is one of the nation's great maritime jurists and 
has justifiably joined the ranks of the great Fifth Circuit Admiralty judges: 
John Minor Wisdom, John Brown, Alvin Rubin, John Duhe, and more. 
3. 936 F.3d 318. 320 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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he fell. Plaintiff later sued for negligence under the Jones Act 
and for unseaworthiness.4 He testified in his deposition that he 
thought he fell on grease. 5 He claimed that the vessel had cables 
above the weather decks; the crew frequently greased the cables, 
and the grease would drip onto the decks.6 While there was an 
overhang above the entrance to the generator room, plaintiff 
claimed grease could be tracked or spread across the deck.] The 
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed and said: "The Jones Act causation 
standard is lower than at common law. But it still requires some 
evidence."8 Grease in places on the ship's deck at various times 
was not sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that 
grease on the deck caused the plaintiff's fall.9 
So, what is the source of this lower causation standard in 
Jones Act cases to which the court referred? The Jones Actio 
grants a seaman a negligence action against the employer. The 
Jones Act, by its terms, incorporates the substantive standards of 
the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),ii which is 
applicable to interstate and international railroad workers. And 
the FELA provides that a railroad is liable to its employees for 
personal injury damages or wrongful death "resulting in whole or 
in part from the negligence" of the railroad.12 
Thus, whenever an employer's negligence causes "in whole or 
in part" injury or death to a seaman, the FELA imposes 
liability.13 Since the Jones Act incorporates the substantive 
standards of the FELA, judicial interpretations of the meaning of 
FELA provisions apply in Jones Act cases. 14 Thus, the "in whole 
4. Id. (He also sought maintenance and a cure). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 320-21. 
8. Id. at 320. 
9. Id. at 322. 
10. Id.; see also 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ("Laws of the United States regulating 
recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an 
action under this section."). 
11. Id.; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 570 (1994). 
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or in part"15 FELA language applies in Jones Act cases. And, the 
United States Supreme Court has provided some intriguing gloss 
on the phrase "in whole or in part."16 That is the subject of this 
Article. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the FELA 
phrase "in whole or in part" several times, most recently in CSX 
TransportationInc. v. McBride.17 Its jurisprudence on the subject 
is confusing, unclear, and inconsistent with mainstream tort law. 
In McBride, the Court held that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to give a jury instruction that required the plaintiff to 
prove that the defendant proximately caused the plaintiffs 
injuries.18 A proper instruction, per the majority, would be to tell 
the jury it should find for the plaintiff on causation if the 
defendant's negligence played a part in causing the plaintiffs 
injuries19. In so holding, the Court did not separate the cause 
inquiry into its two basic, constituent parts: cause-in-fact and 
scope of risk or liability-what the law used to and sometimes 
does still calls "proximate or legal cause."20 The former-cause-
in-fact-is sometimes called factual cause. 21 An act is a factual 
cause of an injury if the factfinder concludes that the injury 
would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's particular 
alleged negligent act.22 Scope of the risk or liability (what courts 
used to and often do still call proximate or legal cause) is a 
limitation on the supposed infinite liability that might result if 
factual cause were all that the law required.23 The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 provides 
that: "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that result 
from the risks that made the actor's conduct negligent."24 The 
15. 45 U.S.C. § 51. 
16. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 570. 
17. See generally 564 U.S. 685 (2011). 
18. Id. at 2634. 
19. Id. at 2635. 
20. Id. at 2336. 
21. DAN DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS § 186 (2d ed. 2020). 
22. Id. 
23. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
293, 294 (2002). 
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(2010). 
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Restatement (Third) does not use the phrases proximate or legal 
cause.2 5 While the Court did not expressly adopt a proximate 
cause or scope of risk requirement in McBride, it clearly 
contemplated some limit on liability for "far out 'but for' 
scenarios."26 The Court just did not explain itself very clearly. 
The United States Supreme Court's lumping together of 
cause-in-fact and scope of risk in one supposed causation inquiry 
blurs two important concepts and, in doing so, repeats an error 
that was common before the ground-breaking work of Leon 
Green and other legal realists.27 Moreover, it has led to continued 
confusion and a concomitant lack of meaningful analysis on each 
part of the so-called causation requirement. Herein, I will 
endeavor to explain the source of the confusion, urge the Court to 
bifurcate the cause-in-fact issue from the scope of risk issue, and 
humbly suggest a broad reading of scope of risk in FELA and 
Jones Act cases given the statutory purposes and the 
jurisprudential history. 
Happily, McBride does not use the phrases "proximate cause" 
or "legal cause."28 Jettisoning those terms from the analysis is 
progress, real progress. Proximate cause leant an air of mystery 
to the law of negligence; more aptly, in enshrouded it in a fog of 
confusion. The phrase disguised the common-sense notion that 
liability was not unlimited, the notion that some risks were 
beyond the scope of risks that made the actor negligent in the 
first place. It made the limitation decision look like a legal 
decision, rather than a fact specific decision based essentially on 
fairness and the experience of the community. The tests courts 
used were confusing- foreseeability, hindsight, direct, remote, 
natural and probable, intervening and superseding causes-
confused; they did not clarify. The Court has wisely abandoned 
the charade, although, as noted, it has not clearly said what 
replaces them. 
In Section II, I will analyze Rogers v. Missouri Pacific 
25. Id. 
26. McBride, 564 U.S at 704. 
27. See generally LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 186-95 (1930); LEON 
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE Cause 76-77 (1927). 
28. See generally McBride, 564 U.S. at 685. 
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Railroad Co.,29 one of the fountainheads of the current muddle. 
Section III will discuss subsequent twentieth century FELA 
causation jurisprudence. Section IV will set forth the questions 
that the early jurisprudence left unanswered; Section V, takes a 
very relevant aside to violation of statute negligence cases under 
FELA and the Jones Act. Section VI analyzes Norfolk Southern 
Ry. Co. v. Sorrell30 and Section VII discusses McBride. Section 
VIII summarizes the critical, scholarly commentary after 
McBride, much of which I relied upon in forming my views. 
Section IX samples the post-McBride jurisprudence. Section X 
sets forth my own analysis and consideration of the issues. And 
Section XI provides a brief conclusion. 
II. ROGERS 
In Rogers an FELA case, a railroad worker was ordered to 
use a hand torch to burn weeds and vegetation off a slope 
adjacent to defendant's rail lines.31 The supervisor instructed the 
worker to move off the tracks when a train passed and to watch 
for any hotboxes on the passing train.32 The reason for the order 
to get away from the tracks when a train approached was that 
the sound of one passing train could mute the sound of another 
approaching train, thereby placing the worker at risk.33 As a 
train approached, plaintiff got off the tracks and watched for 
hotboxes.34 But as he did so, the passing train fanned the fire 
which was burning in the weeds.35 The fire approached the 
plaintiff who, when he moved away, stumbled, and fell into a 
culvert, suffering injury.36 The worker sued the employer.37 
The trial court instructed the jury to find for the defendant if 
the plaintiff employee was "the sole cause of his mishap."38 The 
29. 352 U.S. 500 (1957). 
30. 549 U.S. 158 (2007). 





36. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 501-03 (1957). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 504. 
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jury found for the plaintiff.39 The Missouri Supreme Court 
reversed,40 concluding, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, that 
the plaintiff was the sole cause of his injury.41 The United States 
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, reversed the 
Missouri Supreme Court, and reinstated the jury verdict.42 In 
doing so, Justice Brennan said: 
Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the 
proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer 
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing 
the injury or death for which damages are sought. 43 
The Court continued: 
Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury 
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry 
whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that 
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury 
or death.44 
In reinstating the jury verdict, the Court first noted that the 
jury had apparently decided that the plaintiff was not the sole 
cause of his injuries and that the defendant's negligence had 
played a part in causing the plaintiffs injuries and that there 
was evidence to support those conclusions.45 
Justice Brennan also noted that the Missouri Supreme Court 
opinion could be read to say that the plaintiffs alleged negligence 
was at least as probable a cause for his injury as the defendant's 
fault and, if that were the case, there was no issue for the jury.46 
39. Id. at 505. 
40. Id. at 503-05; 352 U.S. at 524 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(Justice Frankfurter dissented in Rogers and three other cases, arguing that the 
Court should not decide FELA sufficiency of the evidence cases). 
41. Id.; Michael D. Green, The FederalEmployers Liability Act: Sense and 
Nonsense About Causation, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 504 (2012) (Professor 
Michael Green points out that actually the Missouri Supreme Court found that 
there was no negligence of the railroad and that the state court did not use the 
sole cause phrase). 
42. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 511 (1957). 
43. Id. at 506 (emphasis added). 
44. Rogers, 352 U.S at 506-07 (emphasis added). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 505. 
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But the Court noted that the FELA does not require the plaintiff 
to exclude a "conclusion favorable [for] the defendant."47 
Justice Brennan continued: 
The Missouri court's opinion implies its view that this is the 
governing standard by saying that the proofs must show that 
'the injury would not have occurred but for the negligence' of 
his employer, and that '[t]he test of whether there is a causal 
connection is that, absent the negligent act the injury would 
not have occurred.' That is language of proximate causation 
which makes a jury question dependent upon whether the jury 
may find that the defendant's negligence was the sole, efficient, 
producing cause of injury.48 
Of course, torts aficionados will see that Justice Brennan 
merges or conflates two related, but different, concepts: cause-in-
fact and proximate cause. "But for" is the test for cause-in-fact, 
not proximate cause. And the phrase "sole . . . cause" was often 
used in deciding the proximate cause issue. Thus, but for is 
cause-in-fact and sole cause is proximate cause and Justice 
Brennan essentially ran them together.49 His mistake may 
perhaps be forgiven because, first, FELA does not expressly 
separate the two concepts and, second, in the early part of the 
twentieth century, courts often confused or mingled the two 
concepts. 50 I will have much more to say about this later because 
Justice Brennan's conflation of cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause, or what we might more appropriately call scope of 
liability, continues to haunt us today in FELA/Jones Act cases. 
III. GALLICK 
After Rogers, the Court decided Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Co.51 There, defendant railroad had allowed a fetid pool 
47. Id. at 506. 
48. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957). 
49. Id. at 500. 
50. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Let the Jury Decide!A Pleafor the 
ProperAllocation of Decision-MakingAuthority in LouisianaNegligence Cases, 
94 TUL. L. REV. 769, 778 (2020). 
51. 372 U.S. 108 (1963). 
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of stagnant water to remain on its property.52 The pool contained 
the bodies and body parts of rats and pigeons; moreover, insects 
were present on and around the pool.53 While working around the 
pool, a large bug bit plaintiff on the leg.54 The Supreme Court, in 
an opinion by Justice White, described what ensued: 
The wound subsequently became infected. The infection failed 
to respond to medical treatment, and worsened progressively 
until it spread throughout petitioner's body, creating pus-
forming lesions and eventually necessitating the amputation of 
both his legs. None of the doctors who treated and studied 
petitioner's case could explain the etiology of his present 
condition, although some of them diagnosed or characterized it 
as 'pyoderma gangrenosum, secondary to insect bite.'55 
The plaintiff sued in Ohio state court; the jury answered a 
series of special interrogatories.56 Based on the answers to those 
questions, the court found for the plaintiff.57 The Ohio Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding that there was no "'direct evidence that 
the existence of the unidentified bug at the time and place had 
any connection with the stagnant and infested pool,' or had 
become infected by the pool with the substance that caused 
petitioner's infection;" the bug could just as likely come from a 
nearby river or surrounding weeds.58 The Court of Appeals 
thought that there was, at best, a "chain of causation" that was 
speculative and too tenuous to establish liability.59 The Ohio 
Supreme Court declined to review the decision.60 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice White 
said: 
According to the Court of Appeals, the break in the causal 
chain that turned it into a mere 'series of guesses and 
speculations' was the want of evidence from which the jury 
52. Id. at 109. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 109-10. 
56. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 110 (1963). 
57. Id. at 112. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 113. 
60. Id. 
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could properly conclude that respondent's fetid pool had had 
something to do with the insect that bit petitioner. The only 
question was whether or not the insect was from or had been 
attracted by the pool. We hold that the record shows sufficient 
evidence to warrant the jury's conclusion that petitioner's 
injuries were caused by the acts or omissions of respondent. 61 
Direct evidence or more substantial circumstantial evidence 
was not required.62 The maintenance of the fetid pool had 
something to do with the insect that bit petitioner.63 
Additionally, in Crane v. Cedar Rapids & L C. Ry.,64 the 
Court, in dicta, said that under the FELA a plaintiff "is not 
required to prove common-law proximate causation but only that 
his injury resulted 'in whole or in part' from the railroad's 
violation of the Act."65 
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Rogers with its "even the slightest"66 causation language, and 
61. Id. 
62. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 114 (1963). 
63. Id. 
64. 395 U.S. 164 (1969). 
65. Id. at 166. 
66. While not the subject of this lecture, the even the slightest language 
caused other problems. Courts began to export the concept from the causation 
element(s) to the standard of care element and to only require that the plaintiff 
establish the defendant's slight negligence. Then the slight negligence of the 
defendant moved across the "v." to the plaintiffs side and the plaintiff's duty of 
care to him or herself became a duty of slight care, rather than ordinary care. 
The Fifth Circuit cleared up this confusion in Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, 
Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997). There, in an opinion by Judge Duhe, the 
court made clear that the standard of care was ordinary care and that standard 
applied to both the defendant and the plaintiff. Interestingly, in Ferguson v. 
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957), decided the same day as 
Rogers, plaintiff was a second baker on ship. He was ordered to prepare twelve 
servings of ice cream. The ice cream was very frozen so (very frozen?), at some 
point in the operation, he could not extricate the ice cream from the container. 
Absent the availability of an ice chipper, the second baker decided to use a 
sharp butcher knife to loosen the ice cream. Sadly, during the process, his hand 
slipped, resulting in the loss of two fingers on his right hand. He filed suit 
under the Jones Act and the U.S. Supreme Court said he had established 
sufficient evidence that the risk which occurred was foreseeable and that his 
employer was conceivably negligent because the event was foreseeable. In so 
holding, the Court cited and quoted Rogers. It is not altogether clear if it was 
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cases like Gallick, left some unanswered questions because there 
were various ways to interpret the decisions. For instance: 
1. Was the relaxed causation standard limited to cases 
where the plaintiff was alleged to be at fault? That is, was it 
nothing more than a clear reminder that under the FELA,67 the 
plaintiff's negligence would reduce, not bar, recovery.6 8 Gallick 
would seem to belie this interpretation. 
2. Was Rogers and its language simply a condemnation of 
the tendency of some courts to refer to the "sole" cause of an 
accident? 
3. Did Rogers mean that the FELA relaxed the proof needed 
on causation? It would seem so but then on which part of 
"causation?" Cause-in-fact? Proximate cause? Or, both? 
4. Or did Rogers not just relax the causation standard, did it 
eliminate the need to prove proximate cause at all in FEELA and 
Jones Act cases? That was the import of the Cranedictum. 
Clear answers to these questions were not forthcoming. 
Several post-Rogers lower courts noted that the burden of proof 
on causation in an FELA case was lower than in a negligence 
case at common law.69 Consistently, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
ConsolidatedRail Corp. v. Gottshall,70 referred, in dictum, to the 
relaxed standard of causation in FELA cases but said no more on 
that issue. But relaxed on cause-in-fact? Relaxed on proximate 
cause? And what was the standard or standards? 
Arguably going further, in Oglesby v. Southern Pacific 
Transp. Co.,71 the court said that "common law 'proximate cause' 
is not required under the FELA." In Summers v. MissouriPacific 
R.R. System,72 the court expressly noted that some courts had 
held that it would be error to include an instruction on proximate 
cause in an FELA case. As authority, the court cited a leading 
citing it in reference to breach or causation. 
67. 45 U.S.C. § 53. 
68. See generally 45 U.S.C. § 54 (In addition, under the 1939 amendments 
to the FELA, assumption of the risk was not a defense). 
69. See Holbrook v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 414 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Hernandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, Inc., 187 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1999). 
70. Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
71. 6 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1993). 
72. 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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Fifth Circuit decision, Page v. St. Louis Sw. Ry.,73 wherein the 
court said that the definite departure from traditional common-
law tests of proximate causation as applied to the [FELA] came 
in Rogers." In Page, the court held it was error to instruct the 
jury that it must find defendant was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs injury.74 The court said: 
Under the definition of proximate cause in this case, the jury 
was required to find, before the plaintiff could prevail, that the 
cause of his injury was one which in natural and continuous 
sequence [common law proximate cause] produced the event or 
happening in question and without which such event or 
happening would not have occurred [cause-in-fact]. A detailed 
consideration of those requirements would seem to indicate 
that they are not essential to the jury's conclusion in this case 
that employer negligence played a part in producing the 
plaintiff's injury. The same thing would appear to be true of 
the requirement that the accident be the natural and probable 
consequence [proximate cause] of defendant's act or omission 
and such a consequence as ought to have been foreseen 
[proximate cause or breach] by a person in the exercise of 
ordinary care in the light of attending circumstances. Those 
requirements may well have been injurious to the plaintiff. 
They are foreign to the simple test prescribed in Rogers, supra. 
Under that decision, and the long line of Supreme Court cases 
which have followed it, we must hold that the court's 
instructions on proximate causation were erroneous in 
operating to unduly restrict the jury in the exercise of its 
functions. 75 
Thus, some courts simply stated that the burden of proof on 
causation under the FELA and the Jones Act was relaxed. Others 
arguably went further stating that it was error to instruct a jury 
in an FELA and Jones Act case that the defendant was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Did that mean that 
there was no proximate cause or scope of liability requirement in 
FELA and Jones Act cases? What has the Supreme Court said 
more recently? 
73. 312 F.2d 84, 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1963). 
74. Id. at 92. 
75. Id. 
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V. AN ASIDE ON VIOLATION OF STATUTE 
NEGLIGENCE CASES 
Before turning to the post-2000 FELA/Jones Act Supreme 
Court causation jurisprudence, an aside to a closely related legal 
issue is necessary. In a negligence case when a plaintiff alleges 
that the defendant's violation of a statute constitutes a violation 
of the appropriate standard of care (sometimes loosely referred to 
as negligence per se cases), the court must answer two questions 
in determining whether the plaintiff may rely upon the statute as 
the standard of care of a reasonable person or as evidence of the 
standard of care of a reasonable person. 76 Those two questions 
are: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of a class of persons 
which the statute was enacted to protect and (2) whether the risk 
(or type of accident) which arose was a risk which the statute was 
enacted to guard or protect against.77 The second question is 
essentially a scope of the risk or scope of liability question, i.e., it 
is an old school proximate cause question.78 That point is critical 
because of the way in which the United States Supreme Court 
has analyzed violation of statute in FELA and Jones Act cases. 
In a number of decisions, involving violations of the Federal 
Safety Appliance Act,79 and the Boiler Inspection Act,80 the Court 
has held that any defect which constitutes a violation of those 
acts is actionable under the FELA if the violation contributed to 
the injury "without regard to whether the injury flowing from the 
breach was the injury the statute sought to prevent."81 
On the Jones Act side of the ledger, in Kernan v. American 
Dredging Company82 the plaintiff seaman was killed when the 
tug on which he worked caught fire while towing a scow. The 
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 
(2010). 
77. Id. 
78. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primeron the Patternsof Negligence, 53 LA. 
L. REV. 1509, 1517-18 (1993). 
79. 45 U.S.CA. § 2 (2020). 
80. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (2020). 
81. See Coray v. S. Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949); Urie v. Thompson, 337 
U.S. 163 (1949); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66 
(1917); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917). 
82. 355 U.S. 426. 427-28 (1958). 
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seaman's survivors alleged that the fire was caused because an 
open-flame kerosene lamp on the scow's deck ignited very 
flammable vapors lying above petroleum products which had 
accumulated on the water's surface.83 The lamp in question was 
less than three feet above the water. 84 A regulation required that 
lights must be at least eight feet above the water.85 Plaintiffs 
alleged that the violation of the regulation rendered the 
defendant negligent.86 Defendant countered that the purpose of 
the height requirement was to make the lamp visible to other 
vessels in order to avoid a collision.87 That is, defendant 
contended that the regulation was not intended to protect against 
the risk that a low hanging lamp would cause a fire.88 The 
district court held that the lamp was a cause-in-fact of the death 
but that the regulation was not intended to protect against the 
risk which occurred and thus there was no liability.89 The 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, with Justice Brennan writing 
for the majority, reversed, relying on the FELA Federal Safety 
Appliance Act and Boiler Inspection Act cases referenced above 
and said: 
The courts, in developing the FELA with a view to adjusting 
equitably between the worker and his corporate employer the 
risks inherent in the railroad industry, have plainly rejected 
many of the refined distinctions necessary in common-law tort 
doctrine for the purpose of allocating risks between persons 
who are more nearly on an equal footing as to financial 
capacity and ability to avoid the hazards involved. Among the 
refinements developed by the common law for the purpose of 
limiting the risk of liability arising from wrongful conduct is 
the rule that violation of a statutory duty creates liability only 
when the statute was intended to protect those in the position 
of the plaintiff from the type of injury in fact incurred. This 
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Instead, the theory of the FELA is that where the employer's 
conduct falls short of the high standard required of him by this 
Act, and his fault, in whole or in part, causes injury, liability 
ensues. And this result follows whether the fault is a violation 
of a statutory duty or the more general duty of acting with 
care, for the employer owes the employee, as much as the duty 
of acting with care, the duty of complying with his statutory 
obligations. 90 
Given that the scope of injury or risk issue is a proximate 
cause issue masquerading in statutory interpretation clothes and 
that the Supreme Court was willing to impose liability in 
violation of statute cases where the risk which occurred was not 
necessarily a risk the statute was enacted to guard against, then 
perhaps proximate cause really is not requited in FELA and 
Jones Act cases. But now let us turn to what the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself said in recent years. 
VI. SORRELL 
The United States Supreme Court returned to the 
FELA/Jones Act causation issue in Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. 
Sorrell.91 In Sorrell, a railroad employee was driving a dump 
truck loaded with supplies for use in some repairs on a gravel 
road adjacent to the employer's railroad tracks.92 Plaintiff 
claimed that a fellow employee negligently forced him off the 
road into a ditch.93 The other driver claimed that plaintiff simply 
drove off the road into the ditch.94 Relying on the fellow 
employee's version of the events, the employer claimed that 
either it was not liable at all or, at the very least, the plaintiff 
was also negligent and, thus, any recovery should be reduced by 
that negligence.95 The precise issue before the Court was whether 
the standard of proof on causation was the same for both the 
90. Id. at 438-39. 
91. 549 U.S. 158 (2007). 
92. Id. at 160. 
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plaintiff and the defendant.96 Precisely, Missouri's pattern jury 
instructions required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's 
negligence contributed "in whole or in part" to the plaintiffs 
injury.97 Alternatively, the defendant, who alleged the plaintiff 
was negligent, had to establish that the plaintiffs negligence 
"directly contributed to cause the injury."98 The directly 
contributed requirement is essentially a requirement that the 
plaintiffs alleged negligent action was a proximate cause of the 
accident.99 
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the 
defendant appealed, arguing that the FELA required that the 
same burden of proof on causation applied to both the plaintiff 
and the defendant.100 The Court of Appeals affirmed because, per 
the court, in Missouri where there is an approved instruction (as 
there was here), the trial court must give it.1O1 The Missouri 
Supreme Court refused discretionary review.102 Subsequently, 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the 
question of whether the same standard for causation applied to 
both the plaintiff and the defendant.103 At the end of the day, the 
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the same 
standard of proof for causation applied to both the plaintiff and 
the defendant.104 
Noting that the Court, in interpreting the FELA is guided by 
common-law principles, Chief Justice Roberts stated that at 
common law the same standard of causation applied to both the 
plaintiff and the defendant.105 He continued that it would be a 
practical and a theoretical challenge to reduce the plaintiffs 
damages "'in proportion' to the employee's negligence if the 
relevance of each party's negligence to the injury [was] . . . 
96. Id. 
97. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 160-61 (2007). 
98. Id. at 161. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 162. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 162 (2007). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 168. 
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measured by a different standard of causation."106 Using the 
same standard of causation would be comparing "apples to 
apples."107 In so holding, the Court followed the Fifth Circuit and 
cited Page.108 
But what was the standard of causation in FELA and Jones 
Act cases? That question engendered a good bit of discussion in 
Sorrell, more, perhaps, than the issue on which the Court had 
granted certiorari. The railroad argued that the Court should 
consider not just whether the causation standard should be the 
same for the plaintiff and defendant but also what the causation 
standard was. 109 The railroad argued that the plaintiff should 
have to prove that the defendant's negligence was a "proximate" 
cause of the injury.110 It claimed that whatever Rogers did, it did 
not eliminate the requirement hat the defendant be a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injury.1 Sorrell argued that the Supreme 
Court had departed from a "proximate" cause requirement in 
Rogers and, in any event, the Court should not decide the issue 
because it was not the question on which the Court had granted 
certiorari and the defendant's arguments were inconsistent with 
the position it had taken below.112 The Court agreed with Sorrell 
on the procedural points: the Court had not granted certiorari on 
the need to prove "proximate" cause and it would be unfair to 
allow the railroad to switch gears (or tracks) and argue that 
issue. 113 
But the proximate cause question prompted two 
concurrences: one by Justice Souter, in which Justices Scalia and 
Alito joined,114 and one by Justice Ginsburg.115 Justice Souter 
agreed with the majority that the same causation standard 
106. Id. at 169-70. 
107. Id. at 169. 
108. Id. at 164. 
109. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 162 (2007). 
110. Id. at 164. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 163-64. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). 
115. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 177 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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should apply to the plaintiff and the defendant.116 And he agreed 
that the Missouri Supreme Court should decide, in the first 
instance, what that standard was. 117 He wrote to indicate that he 
believed that Rogers did not eliminate the need for the plaintiff to 
establish that the defendant was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injures.118 Justice Souter pointed out that pre-Rogers 
Supreme Court jurisprudence had referred to proximate cause.119 
According to Justice Souter, Rogers "merely instructed courts 
how to proceed when there are multiple cognizable causes of an 
injury."120 This was especially the case where the multiple causes 
included the plaintiff's alleged fault.121 To require the plaintiff to 
establish that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of 
the injury would "undermine" the FELA's implementation of a 
comparative fault regime.122 Justice Souter did admit that the 
"even the slightest" language did not well serve clarity.123 
Justice Ginsburg agreed that the same causation standard 
applied to both the plaintiff and the defendant, but she clearly 
disagreed with Justice Souter on the proximate cause 
requirement.124 She noted that the FELA and Jones Act called for 
a relaxed standard of causation.125 She approvingly cited and 
quoted Rogers'"even the slightest" language.126 
Continuing, Justice Ginsburg opined that, rather than 
eliminating the proximate cause requirement in FELA cases, 
"Rogers describes the test for proximate causation applicable in 
FELA suits.127 That test is whether 'employer negligence played 
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or 
death[.]"'128 Then, citing Justice Andrews dissent in Palsgrafv. 
116. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). 
119. Id. at 174. 
120. Id. at 173. 
121. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 173 (2007). 
122. Id. at 175. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 177-78. 
125. Id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
126. Id. 
127. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 178 (2007). 
128. Id. 
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Long Island R.R. Co.,129 Justice Ginsburg said that proximate 
cause involves, in part, a policy judgment about "how far down 
the chain of consequences a defendant should be responsible for 
its wrongdoing."130 Justice Ginsburg turned to the FELA, as 
Congress' expression of the relevant policy, and pointed out that 
the FELA was enacted to protect railroad workers and that the 
Supreme Court had liberally interpreted it to that end, including 
the plaintiff getting to the jury if she or he proved that the 
defendant's negligence "was even the slightest cause of his 
injury."131 Justice Ginsburg then said: "The 'slightest' cause 
sounds far less exacting than 'proximate cause,' which may 
account for the statements in judicial opinion that Rogers 
dispensed with proximate cause for FELA actions."132 
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that scholars have long 
criticized the confusion that the phrase proximate cause 
engendered and that some had called for replacing "proximate 
cause" with "legal cause."133 Thus, to Justice Ginsburg: 
"[w]henever a railroad's negligence is the slightest cause of the 
plaintiff's injury, it is a legal cause, for which the railroad is 
properly held responsible."134 I will have more to say on scope of 
the risk later. Per Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, the causation 
jury instruction would provide that a party was the proximate 
cause of an injury when the injury resulted in whole or in part 
from the other party's negligence-i.e., such negligence payed 
any part, even the slightest, in causing the injury.135 
Thus, after Sorrell, we knew that the standard of causation 
was the same for the defendant and the plaintiff. Alas, we still 
did not know exactly what that standard of causation was. And 
was the real issue cause-in-fact or scope of the risk (proximate 
cause) or both? 
129. 248 N.Y. 339, 352 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
130. Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 178-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
131. Id. at 179. 
132. Id. 
133. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 179-80 (2007). 
134. Id. at 180. 
135. Id. at 179. 181. 
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VII. MCBRIDE 
The Supreme Court next considered the FELA/Jones Act 
causation question in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride,136 
McBride suffered serious injuries while switching (adding and 
removing) cars on a train.137 McBride claimed that the employer 
was negligent because the equipment employed-wide bodied 
engines and an independent hand brake-was not safe for 
switching and that the employer failed to train him on how to 
properly use the equipment.138 The trial court gave a Seventh 
Circuit pattern jury instruction on causation, which provided: 
"Defendant 'caused or contributed to' Plaintiff's injury if 
Defendant's negligence played a part-no matter how small-in 
bringing about the injury. The mere fact that an injury occurred 
does not necessarily mean that the injury was caused by 
negligence."139 
CSX, the employer, had requested an instruction requiring 
the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's negligence was a 
"proximate cause" of his injury, which it defined as: "any cause 
which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the injury 
complained of, with the qualification that a proximate cause need 
not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause."140 The jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the jury also allocated the 
plaintiff with one-third of the total fault141 CSX appealed 
contending that if the requested instruction had been given a 
jury might have concluded that "the chain of causation was too 
indirect."142 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and, thereafter, CSX 
successfully sought a writ of certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court.143 
A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed.144 Justice 
136. 564 U.S. 685 (2011). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 690. 
140. Id. at 689. 
141. Id. at 690. 
142. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 690 (2011). 
143. Id. at 691. 
144. Id. at 705. 
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Ginsburg essentially turned her concurrence in the judgment in 
Sorrell into the majority opinion-the so-called law of the land. 
In the first paragraph of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote: 
[W]e conclude that the Act [(the FELA)] does not incorporate 
"proximate cause" standards developed in nonstatutory 
common-law tort actions. The charge proper in FELA cases, we 
hold, simply tracks the language Congress employed, 
informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or 
contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's 
negligence played any part in bringing about the injury.145 
CSX had argued that Rogers and its "even the slightest" 
language was intended to clearly show that contributory 
negligence (plaintiff negligence) was not a bar to recovery in 
FELA cases and that it was also aimed at other multiple cause 
cases; i.e., to make clear that there can be multiple responsible 
causes of an accident. The railroad claimed that Rogers was not 
intended to eliminate a proximate cause requirement entirely.146 
Justice Ginsburg rejected such a narrow reading of Rogers. 
Reviewing the facts and language in Rogers, Justice Ginsburg 
said that Rogers was best read as "a comprehensive of the FELA 
causation standard,"147 and "a general standard for causation in 
FELA cases, not one addressed exclusively to injuries involving 
multiple potentially cognizable causes."148 Per Justice Ginsburg, 
the result in Rogers was driven, in part, by prior judicial 
recalcitrance to broadly interpret the FELA to foster its goal of 
improving the plight of injured railroad workers.149 Moreover, she 
noted that every circuit had rejected FELA jury instructions 
using proximate cause language.150 Of course, that is not 
necessarily a rejection of any scope of risk or liability 
requirement. 
In the third section of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg turned 
to CSX's argument that proximate cause is a fundamental 
145. Id. at 688. 
146. Id. at 693. 
147. Id. at 695. 
148. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 696 (2011). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 698. 
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concept in negligence actions. Without it, CSX argued, juries 
would impose liability whenever the plaintiff established "but 
for" causation.151 This is in essence a floodgates argument-the 
Court's failure to require proximate cause in FELA and Jones Act 
cases would open the floodgates of liability. Justice Ginsburg 
brushed that argument aside saying that no one had pointed to 
any absurd results in the history of FELA litigation.152 She then 
reiterated her Sorrell statement that, rather than eliminating 
proximate causation, Rogers described the FELA test for 
proximate cause.153 Here she used the statutory language-"in 
whole or in part"-not the "even the slightest" language.154 
Continuing in the next subsection of the opinion, which is not 
the opinion of the Court because Justice Thomas did not join it, 
Justice Ginsburg noted the confusion that the phrase "proximate 
cause" and all its alternative variations has caused over the 
years. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §29 entirely 
eschewed the term proximate cause-a point to which I will 
return in a later section.155 
In the next subsection of the opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
pointed out that to be held liable the defendant FELA employer 
must be negligent. She said that reasonable foreseeability of 
harm was an ingredient of FELA negligence because 
foreseeability was directly relevant to whether or not the 
defendant had behaved as a reasonable person under the 
circumstances. That is, foreseeability was a relevant factor in 
determining breach. 
Then, critically, returning to causation, Justice Ginsburg said 
judges and jurors can use their "common sense" when dealing 
with far out "but for scenarios."156 Immediately thereafter, she 
approvingly cited two cases: Nicholson v. Erie R. Co.157 and 
151. Id. at 699. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 700. 
154. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 702 (2011). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 703-04. 
157. 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958). 
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Moody v. Boston and Maine Co.158 In Nicholson, the plaintiff 
alleged that the employer failed to provide a lavatory; employee 
was injured by a suitcase while looking for a lavatory in a 
passenger car. 159 The court applied Rogers and affirmed the lower 
court's dismissal for lack of causation.160 In Moody, an employee 
suffered a stress-related heart attack after his employer forced 
him to work more than twelve hours with inadequate breaks.161 
The trial court granted summary judgment finding no causation 
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Rogers, 
affirmed.162 By citing two cases that limited liability based 
essentially on the fact that the injury was not within the scope of 
the risk63 of the negligent act, Justice Ginsburg apparently 
viewed the Rogers standard as sufficient to deal with such 
bizarre cases to limit liability, i.e., she recognized the defendant 
was only liable for those injuries which were within the scope of 
the risk. I will analyze this aspect of the opinion further below. 
Concluding, Justice Ginsburg wrote: 
Juries in . . . [FELA] cases are properly instructed that a 
defendant railroad "caused or contributed to" a railroad 
worker's injury "if [the railroad's] negligence played a part-no 
matter how small-in bringing about the injury." That, indeed, 
is the test Congress prescribed for proximate causation in 
164 FELA cases. 
The reader will once again note the use of "no matter how 
small," rather than Rogers "even the slightest" language. 
Notably, there is absolutely no reference to "proximate case." 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Alito, dissented.165 The Chief contended that the Court erred 
in not requiring a plaintiff in an FELA case to prove proximate 
158. 921 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990). 
159. Nicholson, 253 F.2d at 939. 
160. Id. at 941. 
161. Moody, 921 F.2d at 1. 
162. Id. at 4. 
163. In days of old, a court would have said there was no liability because 
the plaintiff had not established that the defendant was the proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries. 
164. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011). 
165. Id. at 705 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
274 
2021] "Even the Slightest" 
cause. 16 6 To him, the majority only required cause-in-fact (but 
for), but proximate cause was a requisite element in any 
negligence case at common law, which should guide the Court in 
its development of FELA (and Jones Act) jurisprudence. While 
the Chief admitted there were criticisms of the various 
formulations of the idea of proximate cause, he wrote "it is often 
easier to disparage the product of centuries of common law than 
to devise a plausible substitute."167 He said that the FELA 
expressly abrogated common law limitations on recovery in four 
ways-eliminating the bar of contributory negligence, abrogating 
the fellow servant doctrine, eliminating the defense of 
assumption of the risk, and rendering written waivers of liability 
unenforceable-but Congress did not expressly eliminate the 
1need for a plaintiff to prove proximate cause. 6 8 The Chief read 
the "whole or in part" language as a cross reference to the FELA's 
creation of a comparative fault regime, not as an elimination of 
the proximate cause requirement.169 
If there is no need to prove proximate cause in FELA cases, 
the Chief Justice Roberts opined that defendants would be held 
liable for injuries that were not probable or foreseeable.170 
Without a proximate cause requirement, all the majority was 
requiring was "but for" causation.171 Counsel for McBride had 
argued for "but for plus a relaxed form of legal cause."172 The 
majority test, per Chief Justice Roberts, had no "plus."173 Chief 
Justice Roberts proceeded to review pre-Rogers FELA 
jurisprudence and scholarship requiring proximate cause, and 
then turned to Rogers itself which he read as rejecting sole cause 
analysis as well as emphasizing that the FELA created a 
comparative fault regime where a plaintiff, who was just as much 
to blame for an accident as a defendant, still recovered, albeit a 
166. Id. at 706. 
167. Id. at 707. 
168. Id. at 708. 
169. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 709-10 (2011). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 710. 
173. Id. 
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reduced award.174 He wrote: "we have never held-until today-
that FELA entirely eliminates proximate cause as a limit on 
liability."175 
Chief Justice Roberts did not see the majority's statement 
that the jury could consider foreseeability of the risk at the 
breach stage as a cure for its elimination of proximate cause 
because that would not eliminate liability where the risk of 
injury was foreseeable, but the injury was not "directly" caused 
by the defendant's negligence.176 Chief Justice Roberts also took 
the majority to task for using different verbal formulations of its 
causation test: 
The Court's opinion fails to settle on a single test for answering 
these questions: Is it that the railroad's negligence "pla[y] a 
part-no matter how small-in bringing about the [plaintiff's] 
injury," as the Court indicates . . . or that "negligence play any 
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury[.]" . . . The 
Court says there is no difference . . . but I suspect lawyers 
litigating FELA cases will prefer one instruction over the 
other, depending on whether they represent the employer or 
the employee. 177 
The Chief reiterated his call for the incorporation of 
proximate cause as an element in an FELA case: 
Proximate cause . . . is useful to ask whether the injury that 
resulted was within the scope of the risk created by the 
defendant's negligent act; whether the injury was a natural or 
probable consequence of the negligence; whether there was a 
superseding or intervening cause; whether the negligence was 
anything more than an antecedent event without which the 
harm would not have occurred . . . law has its limits. But no 
longer when it comes to the causal connection between 
negligence and a resulting injury covered by FELA. A new 
maxim has replaced the old: Caelum terminus est-the sky's 
the limit.1 78 
174. Id. at 711-13. 
175. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 715 (2011). 
176. Id. at 717. 
177. Id. at 718-19. 
178. Id. at 719-20. 
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To sum up, Chief Justice Roberts essentially called for a 
traditional proximate cause requirement and test. 
VIII. THE COMMENTATORS REACTION 
Commentators responded to McBride. In The Federal 
Employers Liability Act: Sense and Nonsense About Causation,179 
Professor Michael D. Green, reviewed the pre-McBride 
jurisprudence and the confusion which ensued.180 He adopted a 
somewhat wistful tone in noting that McBride did not clear up 
the confusion. He lamented that the majority did not analytically 
separate factual cause (cause-in-fact, or but for causation) from 
the scope of risk or liability (i.e., the dated common law's 
proximate cause).181 He opined that the Rogers "in whole or in 
part" language may have some relevance where the evidence of 
factual causation was uncertain.182 Optimistically, he said that 
the Court had attempted to jettison the mumbo jumbo magic 
words of proximate cause.183 He also pointed out that the Court 
did include a scope of liability limitation but that it was not 
artfully worded, i.e., juries and judge could use their common 
sense to deal with "far out" but for cases to limit liability (and 
also to allow a judge to take a case form a jury).184 
The late Professor David W. Robertson in CausationIssues in 
FELA and Jones Act Cases in the Wake of McBride185 also found 
the decision and opinions in McBride less than satisfying. In 
vintage, clear Robertson style, he listed the theoretical 
possibilities for what the post-McBride standard of causation 
179. See Green, supra note 41. 
180. See id. 
181. Id. at 538-40. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 538. 
184. Id. at 541. 
185. David W. Robertson, CausationIssues in FELA and JonesAct Cases in 
the Wake of McBride, 36 TuL. MAR. L.J. 397 (2012); see also David W. Robertson 
& Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law 
and the NationalLevel and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 36 TuL. MAR. L.J. 
425, 432-33 (2012); Michael J. Daly et al., Recent Developments in Admiralty 
and MaritimeLaw. 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 135. 136-37 (2011). 
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actually might be and came up with six possibilities.186 He 
concluded that the most likely reading of the holding was that 
the "FELA lacks a formal fourth [proximate/legal cause/ scope of 
liability] requirement, but courts can find a way within the 
Rogers language to rule as a matter of law for defendants in 
cases of extremely and inappropriately remote causation."187 He 
expanded later: 
Not only must trial judges avoid telling juries anything 
suggestive of traditional common law proximate cause, they 
186. The six possibilities were: 
#1. FELA is a four-element tort, not the usual five. The traditional 
fourth requirement-proximate cause-has been entirely excised from 
the Act. 
#2. FELA lacks a formal fourth requirement, but the Rogers jury 
instruction-that causation is satisfied if the railroad's negligence 
played any part (even the slightest, no matter how small, etc.) in 
bringing about the accident or illness-will, when subjected to the 
common sense of jurors (who are, after all, generally instructed to 
apply common sense), lead juries to weed out cases of extremely and 
inappropriately remote causation. 
#3. FELA lacks a formal fourth requirement, but courts can find a 
way within the Rogers language to rule as a matter of law for 
defendants in cases of extremely and inappropriately remote 
causation. 
#4. Like common law Negligence, the FELA Negligence cause of 
action is a five-element tort. FELA's fourth requirement is not 
traditional common law proximate cause. But, like traditional 
common law proximate cause, this requirement does permit courts to 
rule as a matter of law that the accident or illness of which the 
plaintiff complains bears a too-attenuated connection with the 
defendant's tortious conduct. This doctrine, which needs a different 
name from proximate cause-perhaps "producing cause," or "legal 
cause," or "scope of liability"-might take its content from: 
(a) The "risk within array" approach of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, or 
(b) The "refocused breach" variant of the Restatement (Third)'s 
risk-within-array approach. 
#5. FELA harbors the Souter/Sorrell version of proximate cause. 
#6. FELA harbors a full-blown, old-fashioned common law proximate 
cause requirement. 
Robertson, 36 TuL. MAR. L.J., supranote 185, at 411-12. 
187. Id. at 411. 
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must themselves also eschew resorting to proximate cause 
concepts for making matter-of-law determinations in FELA 
cases. Nevertheless, the McBride Court indicated that trial 
judges are enabled to rule as a matter of law for FELA 
defendants whose negligence has brought about injuries to 
workers in ways that are too "absurd or untoward" for liability 
to be appropriate. In other words, it turns out that counsel for 
McBride was correct in substance when he told the Court at 
oral argument that "the correct standard for recovery under 
FELA is "but-for plus a relaxed form of legal cause."188 
Courts would be left to wrestle with the confusion and find no 
liability when, based on the language in Rogers and McBride, 
there is "but for" causation but, "there is no connection of any 
kind between the accident or illness and those features of the 
situation that made the defendant's conduct negligent."189 That 
is, juries and judges could still find that some risks which a 
defendant factually caused were not within the scope of the risks 
which made the defendant's conduct negligent (a breach of the 
appropriate standard of care). 
Another commentator, John E. Holloway, referred to Justice 
Ginsburg's appeal to common sense to limit liability in cases of 
far out but-for causation as judicial activism.190 Two others 
lamented the Court's failure to impose a proximate case or scope 
of liability requirement in FELA and Jones Act cases and 
proposed legislative responses. 191 Both expressed concern that 
the McBride decision would or could lead to unlimited liability. 
Another student commentator was also concerned about 
unlimited liability, was wary of the Court's "common sense" 
approach to causation, and proposed reliance on coincidental 
causation cases as a potential limiting principle.192 As the author 
188. Id. at 417-18. 
189. Id. at 420. 
190. John E. Holloway, JudicialActivism in Admiralty Cases, 43 TuL. MAR. 
L.J. 21, 43-48 (2018). 
191. Aaron Maples, Comment, Muddy Waters: The End of Proximate Cause 
in FELA and Jones Act Cases, 10 Loy. MAR. L. J. 399 (2012); Trent R. Byquist, 
Comment, Derailing FELA's Causation Standard: The Supreme Court's 
Misinterpretationof FELA in McBride and Suggestions to Restrict the Potential 
for Unlimited CarrierLiability, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 559 (2012). 
192. Brett R. Noble, Comment, Are Railroads Liable When Lightning 
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noted coincidental causation occurs in cases where the injury and 
the breach of the standard of care are coincidental.193 An 
automobile driver may have been speeding and that is what put 
her at the place of the accident when it occurred (rather than at 
some point upstream-earlier on her route-from the accident) so 
the speeding was a "but for" cause of the accident.194 They would 
not have been where they were when the accident occurred but 
for their speeding.195 However, the negligence (speeding) did not 
increase the chance of the accident occurring.196 That is, 
recurrence of the negligent behavior would not increase the risk 
of the injury. Another way to say this may be that the risk which 
occurred was not within the scope of liability associated with the 
negligent act. Be that as it may, courts have not expressly 
adopted the coincidental causation approach to the FELA/Jones 
Act causation definition. 
IX. A SAMPLING OF POST-MCBRIDE JURISPRUDENCE 
What have courts done since McBride? I have no intention of 
being encyclopedic in this section but rather to sample a few 
decisions. In Huffman v. Union PacificR.R.197 the court reversed 
a jury verdict for the plaintiff because it concluded that "there 
was no expert testimony to support a link between Huffman's 
performance of his work duties in less than ergonomically 
optimal ways-a result of the railroad's negligence-and the 
specific knee problem he suffer[ed], which is osteoarthritis."198 In 
Huckaba v. CSX Transportation,Inc.,199 the court said that the 
burden of proof on causation in FELA cases is lighter, but it read 
McBride as requiring more proof of causation than "but for."200 
The court pointed to Justice Ginsburg's citations of Nicholson 
Strikes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1538 (2012). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 1539. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 1540. 
197. 675 F.3d 412, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2012). 
198. Id. 
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and Moody, infra.201 In Huckaba, the plaintiff alleged that he 
injured himself lifting a generator which was necessitated 
because his employer did not have enough batteries on hand, i.e., 
if there had been more charged batteries available the generator 
would not have been needed.202 The court granted summary 
judgment and dismissed that claim.203 
In Gaston v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,204 the court did not read 
McBride as totally eliminating a proximate cause requirement 
but as recognizing a relaxed causation standard.205 The court 
there cited to and quoted from Justice Ginsburg's opinion and 
said "[o]nly when 'common sense' dictates that a 'but-for' scenario 
is too attenuated or 'far out' should a district court not send a 
claim to the jury."206 Other courts have effectively concluded that 
there is no proximate cause limitation in FELA and Jones Act 
cases. 207 In Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., the court noted that "but 
for" causation was required (and lacking).208 
X. AND SO? 
Thus, courts continue to speak in a bit of an analytical haze, 
not unlike the post-Rogerslpre-McBride jurisprudence, even if 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at *4. 
a. 203. Id. at *6 (The court did not dismiss various other claims and the 
plaintiffs ultimately prevailed.); see Niederhofer v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., No. 5-10-
0392, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 2644 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2011) (interpreting 
McBride as requiring more than "but for" causation). 
204. No. 2:17-CV-1151, 2020 WL 5593262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2020). 
205. Id. at *11. 
206. Id.; see also Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1153, 2012 WL 
13026806, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 12, 2012). 
207. Wardwell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 88 N.E. 3d 772, 776 (Ill. 2017) 
(Interestingly, the decision allowed the defendant to argue that the plaintiff was 
the "sole" negligent party who caused his injury); see also Mickey v. BNSF Ry. 
Co., 358 S.W. 3d 138, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (Not an error to refuse to instruct 
that plaintiff must establish defendant was a proximate cause of his injuries). 
208. Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 536 F. App'x. 717 (6th Cir. 2013). Courts 
have also discussed the precise language of an FELA instruction after McBride. 
For instance, in Cooke v. CSX Transp., Inc., 408 S.W. 3d 752, 757 (Ky. 2012), 
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a jury instruction need not include "no 
matter how slight" where it included the "in whole or in part language." It 
would be fair to say that some confusion continues. 
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they achieve sensible results. Uniformity of approach and 
analysis are clearly absent. That said, despite the analytical 
confusion, the sky has not fallen. There has not been unlimited, 
injury-crippling, commercial gears halting liability. And that is to 
be expected because the universe of claims-from interstate and 
international railroad workers and seamen-is not large. But 
even in the limited universe of the claims at issue, liability has 
not been staggering, and while my review has not been 
exhaustive, there are not many cases that even cause the reader 
concern about unlimited liability to be concerned. No courts have 
imposed liability when lightning strikes. 
Perhaps there is a message there. Maybe proximate cause is 
just not worth the effort-anywhere at all. Maybe juries and 
judges simply deciding breach, cause, and damages get it right 
without worrying about the proximate cause mumbo jumbo of the 
common law and its litany of supposed tests: foreseeable, 
unforeseeable, foresight, hindsight, direct, remote, natural and 
probable, intervening, superseding, and on and on and on. 
Perhaps, going further, courts and jurors do not really need to 
worry about scope of risk or scope of liability at all. It will work 
out. I confess life would be simpler and there is an appeal to 
finally just punting. But doing so would be a radical departure 
from the common law, even the common law of today, and would 
increase the risk of outlier results in bizarre cases. In American 
law, the notion that there is a scope of risk limitation on liability 
is universal and the Court's failure to expressly state it in FELA 
and Jones Act cases stands in stark contrast to mainstream law. 
While I prefer not to call it "proximate cause," as Chief Justice 
Roberts did in McBride, he is right that that requiring more than 
"but for" causation-what we may call scope of risk-in negligent 
cases is a vital component of Twenty-first Century negligence 
law.209 Consequently, I venture a few additional observations and 
a modest proposal. 
First, I offer a historical note on causation. The FELA, 
passed in 1908, provides that a railroad is liable when its 
negligence causes "in whole or in part," an employee's injury or 
209. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 706-07 (2011) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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death.210 The FELA, and hence the Jones Act, do not expressly 
separate cause-in-fact from proximate/legal cause or scope of the 
risk. But it is also true that common law courts themselves often 
spoke of causation without bisecting the inquiry.211 Indeed, 
Justice Andrews in his famous dissent in Palsgrafv. Long Island 
R.R. Co., which Justice Ginsburg cited in Sorrell and McBride, 
includes cause-in-fact as a part of proximate cause. 212 
Congress enacted the FELA during the time when the single 
causation analysis practice was not uncommon. One of the great 
contributions of the legal realists, people like Leon Green and 
Wex Malone, was to clearly separate the cause-in-fact question 
from the scope of liability question. Thus, simply because the 
FELA does not expressly call for a proximate cause or scope of 
liability analysis does not mean it should not be an element of a 
modern negligence action. The FELA and Jones Act are products 
of their times and the times have changed as has the common 
law. I will return to this point in a moment. 
Second, another target of the realists was sole cause 
language and sole cause conclusions. Rogers rejection of sole 
causation language was consistent with modern terminology and 
2 1 3remains so. It is not helpful or accurate to speak of a sole 
cause. Everything in life, including accidents and injuries, has an 
infinite number of causes stretching back to Eden or the Big 
Bang-depending upon your beliefs. Moreover, sole cause 
language reared and continues to rear its head in cases, like 
Rogers, where the alleged sole cause of the injury is the plaintiff's 
negligence.214 That means sole cause conclusions tend to 
undermine and even conflict with comparative fault. Happily, 
McBride keeps sole cause language appropriately buried.215 
210. 45 U.S.C. § 54 (2020). 
211. Galligan, 94 TUL. L. REV., supranote 50, at 778. 
212. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 354 (1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting) ("The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many other 
causes, must be, at the least, something without which the event would not 
happen."). 
213. Cf. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996). 
214. See, e.g., id. (General maritime law tort case, not a Jones Act case). 
215. But see Wardwell, 88 N.E. 3d at 772. (Interestingly, the decision 
allowed the defendant to argue that the plaintiff was the "sole" negligent party 
who caused his injury). 
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Third, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in McBride,216 like her 
concurrence in Sorrell,217 urges courts to abandon the words 
"proximate cause." Doing so is a fabulous, if belated, tribute to 
Leon Green and it is a blessing for judges, lawyers, and law 
students. The phrase and its litany of ambiguous, befuddling, so-
called tests befogged; they did not clarify. The Restatements used 
the term "legal cause" instead of proximate cause.218 That 
substitution was not particularly helpful, even if slightly less 
mis-titled than proximate cause. The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 eschews those terms 
entirely and provides that: "An actor's liability is limited to those 
harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct 
tortious."219 The Restatement (Third) tells it like it is-the 
question is scope of the risk. Is the risk in this case one of the 
risks which made what the defendant did a breach of the 
appropriate standard of care? Happily, McBride does not take us 
back into the misleading morass of proximate cause language. 
Justice Ginsburg is right on this point. The dissenters are wrong. 
But, while McBride is post-modern in taking tort law away 
from proximate or legal cause terminology, it is not so up-to-date 
when it continues the FELA and Rogers tendency to merge 
cause-in-fact and scope of risk or scope of liability. Justice 
Ginsburg wrote that the FELA in requiring causation in whole or 
in part expresses the FELA (and Jones Act) test for proximate 
cause.220 But she did not carefully state-and no U.S. Supreme 
Court decision since Rogers has-that the causation inquiry 
involves two distinct elements: cause-in-fact and some limitation 
on the scope of risk or liability. She clearly contemplated cause-
in-fact when she talked about common sense limiting far out but 
for causes but did not expressly state that cause-in-fact and legal 
limitation or scope of liability were separate inquiries. That is the 
common law of the Twenty-first Century and the Court, in 
216. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011). 
217. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 180 (2007). 
218. Restatement (First) of Torts § 9; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 9 
(Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
219. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harms § 29 (Am. Law 
Inst. 2010). 
220. McBride. 564 U.S. at 705. 
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interpreting the FELA and the Jones Act should be guided by the 
common law.221 Instead of separating cause-in-fact and scope of 
the risk, Justice Ginsburg keeps them conflated, stating that 
"[p]roperly instructed on negligence and causation" and told to 
use their "common sense" jurors can deal with far out but for 
cases but that proper instruction on causation is the "in whole or 
in part" causation instruction with no separation of case-in-fact 
and scope of liability.222 
Historically, and today, FELA and Jones Act cases that 
involve cause-in-fact and those that involve scope of liability 
analytically get mixed together. For instance, in Jones, which I 
described at the start of this talk, the issue really was cause-in-
fact. The plaintiff could not establish that the defendant's having 
allowed grease to occasionally collect on deck had caused him to 
fall.223 It was impossible to say that but for the grease, the 
plaintiff would not have fallen because the plaintiff could not 
show any grease on his pants, on his shoes, or in the area where 
he fell. Likewise, Huffman v. Union Pacific Railroad224 was a 
cause-in-fact case. The plaintiff could not establish that his 
osteoarthritis was caused by cumulative trauma from the 
demands of his job.225 He could not show that but for the work 
trauma, he would not have had the condition.226 Moreover, 
Gallick was a cause-in-fact case.227 Did the bug that bit the 
plaintiff come from the defendant's fetid pool or from somewhere 
else?228 In none of these cases, do the courts specifically speak to 
and analyze cause-in-fact. They discuss causation generally. That 
confuses the law and is a throwback to when cause-in-fact and 
scope of liability were a unified concept or element in negligence 
cases. 
Analyzing cause-in-fact as a separate element would 
encourage consideration of a very important question. Is the 
221. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
222. McBride, 564 U.S. at 705. 
223. Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 2019). 
224. 675 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2012). 
225. Id. at 426. 
226. Id. 
227. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 113 (1963). 
228. Id. 
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standard for cause-in-fact relaxed in an FELA/Jones Act case? 
Should it be? Should it be lower than at common law? Even 
though the FELA and the Jones Act are not workers' 
compensation statutes, should a relaxed burden of factual cause 
apply as it does in many workers' compensation regimes?229 The 
Court has not considered this question, in part, perhaps, because 
it has been mired in the single "causation" swamp. A relaxed 
standard on cause-in-fact might mean that the plaintiff need not 
establish cause-in-fact as a probability but perhaps only as a 
possibility. And under that standard Huffman may have been 
able to establish cause-in-fact. Indeed, Gallick's "something to do 
with" phrase seems like a relaxed cause-in-fact requirement.230 
Moving on, while some may opine that McBride totally 
eliminated the proximate cause or scope of liability requirement 
entirely, it clearly did not do so. 231 Justice Ginsburg, as noted, 
stated that factfinders when "properly instructed" and told to use 
their "common sense" would not award damages in "far out" but 
for scenarios.232 She continued: "Indeed, judges would have no 
warrant to submit such cases to the jury."233 As I said above, she 
approvingly cited two cases for her common sense proposition: 
Nicholson v. ErieR. Co.234 and Moody v. Boston and Maine Co.235 
In Nicholson, a female railroad worker worked in the shops 
where there was no restroom for women.236 Thus, when the 
plaintiff had to go to the bathroom, she had to walk to one of the 
cars standing on adjacent tracks.237 During a trip to a restroom in 
a railroad car, plaintiff was injured by a passenger's suitcase.238 
Even though there was cause-in-fact, the court did not hold the 
railroad liable.239 Cause and effect were according to the court (in 
229. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dillard's Dep't Store, 759 So. 2d 1074 (La. Ct. 2d 
Cir. 2000). 
230. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 113. 
231. McBride, 564 U.S. at 704. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. 253 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1958). 
235. 921 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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proximate cause parlance) too far removed to justify liability.240 
In Moody, a railroad worker's widow sued her late husband's 
employer, claiming that his fatal heart attack was the result of 
the long hours he had worked and interruptions to his rest when 
off-duty because of schedule shifts.241 The trial court granted 
summary judgment because it was not foreseeable (proximate 
cause, not breach, parlance) that the worker would suffer a heart 
attack from stress of which the railroad was never informed.242 
Both courts employed proximate cause terminology and 
reasoning to limit liability and Justice Ginsburg cited them 
approvingly. In both, "but for" causation was arguably 
established but there was no liability.243 The two cited decisions 
stand for the proposition that even under the Justice Ginsburg 
analysis, there is some limitation on liability in FELA negligence 
cases. But the problem under Justice Ginsburg's common-sense 
rule remains: what is the standard and what is the content of a 
proper jury instruction on scope of liability and what is the 
concomitant legal standard a court should use when deciding 
whether to send the case to the jury. It is not foreseeability244 or 
240. Id. 
241. Moody, 921 F.2d at 2. 
242. Id. at 5. 
243. For instance, in Nicholson, if there had been a woman's restroom in the 
shops the plaintiff would not have had to look for one elsewhere. But for the 
failure to provide the restroom, plaintiff would not have suffered injury from a 
passenger's luggage in a train car looking for a woman's restroom. And in 
Moody, while cause-in-fact is not as clear it seems the court merely accepted the 
possibility that but for the extra work the heart attack would not have occurred 
but there was no liability because the heart attack was not foreseeable. 
244. Chief Justice Roberts was correct in saying that merely because 
foreseeability is relevant to determining breach does not solve the problem of 
unlimited liability. For instance, in McBride, it was a breach of the duty to 
exercise reasonable care to provide safe equipment and instructions how to use 
that equipment. It is foreseeable that the failure to provide proper equipment 
and instruction while switching railroad cars might result in personal injury. 
But imagine that after injuring his wrist the plaintiff had gone off to his car to 
go to the hospital, but his car did not start because the starter failed. Then 
imagine a co-worker offered to give the plaintiff a ride in his car. The co-worker 
providing the ride had COVID-19 but was asymptomatic. The plaintiff caught 
COVID-19 and sued the employer for the COVID-19. A jury might properly find 
that the employer was negligent-i.e., breached the duty to exercise reasonable 
care-because the failure to provide proper equipment might foreseeably cause 
injury to a worker. But contracting COVID-19 from a co-worker is not one of the 
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remoteness, as she makes clear in her opinion, because those 
ideas hearken back to proximate cause. 
As noted, John Holloway was critical of the far out cause test, 
but an instruction asking a juror to use their common sense in 
determining scope of liability is infinitely superior to a jury 
instruction that returns to the mumbo jumbo magic words of 
proximate cause.245 What more might the jury be told? As noted, 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physicaland EmotionalHarm § 
29 eschews those terms proximate and legal cause entirely and 
provides that: "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that 
result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious."246 I 
have written elsewhere on the subject of scope of liability and 
jury instructions on that issue. I said: 
The court should ask the jury, when deciding scope of liability, 
whether the general type of injury that the plaintiff suffered 
was one of the harms risked when the defendant acted, and 
acted negligently. That is, "Jurors, do you associate the type of 
injury which plaintiff suffered with the risks defendant's 
conduct posed?" I would add, but not insist upon, "In so 
deciding you should rely upon your common sense, your 
experience, and your sense of fairness." I believe the word 
fairness, while not free of opacity, is much clearer to the 
ordinary person than foreseeability, direct, remote, 
intervening, superseding, etc. It is, in essence, a command to 
the fact finder to do the right thing in the case before the 
court-and only that case.247 
In FELA/Jones Act cases, in recognition of the so-called 
relaxed causation standard, I would suggest that the court might 
add: In determining whether the injury was within the risks 
defendant's conduct posed you should keep in mind that 
Congress enacted this law [FELA/Jones Act] to provide protection 
risks that made the failure to provide equipment negligent. Chief Justice 
Roberts, to quote his dissent, might say the COVID-19 damages were not the 
direct result of the breach. I would prefer to say that they were not within the 
scope of risks which made the employer's act negligent. 
245. John E. Holloway, JudicialActivism in Admiralty Cases, 43 TUL. MAR. 
L.J. 21, 43-48 (2018). 
246. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harms § 29 (Am. Law 
Inst. 2010). 
247. Galligan, 94 TUL. L. REV., supranote 50, at 830. 
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and relief to injured workers. 
It bears pointing out that even though Justice Ginsburg's 
common-sense limitation on far out cases is not an expressly 
proximate cause or scope of liability requirement, she did 
contemplate that it is the jury that uses its common sense in 
deciding whether the case is too far out.248 Put in the terms I 
would prefer; it is the jury which decides scope of risk or liability. 
This is what the Restatement (Third) provides.249 Only if 
reasonable minds could not disagree may the jury grant a 
summary judgment on far-outness or scope of risk. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Thus, at the end of the day, there is still confusion and there 
is also the somewhat unsettling decision in Kernan which 
imposed liability in a violation of statute case even though the 
risk which occurred was not one of the risks the statute was 
enacted to protect against. That seems a clear refutation of any 
proximate cause or limitation of liability prong in Jones Act 
violation of statute cases. Interestingly, Kernan, like Rogers, is 
an opinion on the appropriate limitation of liability25O by Justice 
Brennan. Neither matches up very well with the traditional or 
even modern structure of negligence. Kernan also seems 
analytically inconsistent with McBride and its common-sense 
limits on liability. Perhaps, Kernan can be read as standing for 
the proposition that in FELA and Jones Act violation of statute 
cases, courts should interpret the scope of targeted statutory 
risks very broadly because of the FELA and Jones Act policies of 
protecting and providing relief to injured railroad workers and 
seamen. That is consistent with my proposed jury instruction 
urging jurors in FELA and Jones Act cases to bear in mind the 
pro-worker policies behind those two statutes. But to be 
consistent, there must be some limit, albeit a rather distant 
limit. 
Plaintiffs may lament that I opine that there is some liability 
248. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 700 (2011). 
249. See, e.g., Galligan, 94 TUL. L. REV., supranote 50, at 829. 
250. I use the phrase limitation of liability in a tort sense not an admiralty 
sense. 
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limiting device left in FELA/Jones Act cases, but they should not 
be too quick to wish for the elimination of a scope of the risk 
limitation on liability. Why? Sorrell. What is sauce 251 for the 
goose on cause would be sauce for the gander on cause. Since 
Sorrell held that the standard for proving causation for the 
plaintiff is the same as the standard of causation for the 
defendant alleging comparative fault, that would mean that if 
the plaintiff only has to establish but for causation to establish 
liability then the defendant only has to establish but for 
causation to establish comparative fault. That is a bad thing for 
injured workers. 
Who will answer all the unanswered questions? Hopefully, 
the United States Supreme Court-sometime soon. And when it 
does, I would urge the Court to request an amicus brief from 
some torts teachers. 
251. The adage seems particularly appropriate because sauce and cause 
have all the same letters and one of the two words turns into the other and back 
again with the transposition of the letters s and c. 
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